

# THE ROLE OF THE VILLAGE CONSULTATIVE BODY (BPD) IN SUPERVISING VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TOLONDADU I VILLAGE, BOLAANG MONGONDOW REGENCY

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## ABSTRACT

The strategic implementation of horizontal checks-and-balances is a key determinant for transparent rural governance, yet it is often restricted by complex micro-level structural realities. This study aims to determine and analyze: (1) how the Village Consultative Body (BPD) operationalizes its sequential supervisory strategies over village administration and infrastructure planning, and (2) the multidimensional barriers that hinder the BPD from optimizing its horizontal check-and-balance function. Executed in Tolondadu I Village, Bolaang Uki District, South Bolaang Mongondow Regency, this study adopted a qualitative descriptive design. Data were collected through field observations, secondary documentation analysis, and semi-structured in-depth interviews using a purposive sampling technique with key informants, including the Village Head, BPD members, and local community representatives. The data were evaluated inductively using the interactive analysis model (data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing) and validated through source and technical triangulation. The results indicate that: (1) the BPD formalizes its oversight through distinct structural phases (data collection, real-time concurrent monitoring, and post-activity assessment) across key village sectors such as infrastructure development, BUM Desa management, and asset mutations. When compliance errors occur, the BPD executes a four-stage sequential escalation protocol consisting of regulatory monitoring, persuasive warnings, internal clarification meetings, and executive escalation to the Camat and Bupati; (2) the optimization of this supervisory framework collapses into a superficial year-end bureaucratic formality due to a multidimensional bottleneck. This constraint is driven internally by severe capacity deficits linked to varied and low formal educational levels among BPD members, an absolute absence of regional technical guidance (*Bimtek*) from higher government tiers, and an internal breakdown of active member participation.

**Keywords :** BPD Supervision, Village Governance, Agency Theory, Capacity Deficits, Technical Guidance, Horizontal Accountability.

## INTRODUCTION

Transparent and accountable governance at the local level serves as the structural foundation for sustainable regional development. From the perspective of Public Sector Agency Theory, local governance frameworks can be understood as an agency relationship where the community acts as the principal that delegates authority to the village government as the agent to manage public resources [1]. However, channeling substantial fiscal authority directly to the village level frequently triggers agency problems, such as information asymmetry and moral hazard, where agents potentially ignore

public preferences to serve elite interests. To mitigate these systemic risks, the institutionalization of robust horizontal checks-and-balances mechanisms is absolutely critical to control agent behavior and ensure that the utilization of public funds aligns completely with the welfare of the principal.

In Indonesia, the implementation of these horizontal checks and balances is formally regulated through fiscal decentralization reforms encapsulated in Village Law No. 6 of 2014. This regulation grants wide autonomy to villages to independently manage the Village Fund

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(*Dana Desa*). As the designated local legislative monitoring instrument at the grassroots level, Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) No. 110 of 2016 specifically mandates the Village Consultative Body (BPD) to execute three primary functions: discussing and agreeing upon draft village regulations, accommodating and channeling community aspirations, and supervising the performance of the Village Head. Under this legal framework, the BPD is theoretically positioned as a "village parliament" equipped with strong political legitimacy to enforce horizontal accountability toward achieving clean and democratic village administration.

Although regulatory mandates have rigidly defined the ideal role of the BPD, empirical reality on the ground often exhibits significant deviations. In Tolondadu I Village, the BPD's supervisory function over physical infrastructure development projects such as farm production roads and irrigation channels has not operated optimally. The oversight process tends to be a mere administrative formality at the end of the fiscal year rather than active, continuous monitoring embedded throughout the fiscal cycle. The primary issue emerging is superficial supervision, where the BPD fails to detect project delays and the low quality of construction materials. This local legislative incapacity weakens governance transparency, heightens the risk of regulatory non-compliance, and triggers public dissatisfaction regarding the utility of the village budget.

The failure to optimize the supervisory function in Tolondadu I Village is rooted in a

complex, multidimensional bottleneck. The dominating internal factor is capacity deficits within the BPD itself, where most members possess limited formal educational backgrounds and lack technical understanding regarding financial management and infrastructure auditing [2]. This condition is exacerbated by the absolute absence of regular technical guidance (*Bimtek*) programs from the regional government. Furthermore, severe structural friction exists in the form of local political factionalism and hidden conflicts of interest among BPD personnel, which paralyze institutional solidarity [3]. External barriers also emerge from inefficient local coordination loops, where the Village Head, acting as the agent, tends to restrict access to budget documents, while section heads (*Kasi*) as activity managers frequently delay the submission of physical progress reports.

Scholarly literature has extensively explored the effectiveness of the BPD from a macro perspective, frequently focusing on its involvement in drafting village regulations in coastal regions [4] or its normative partnership with traditional customary institutions [5]. Nevertheless, a clear research gap persists, as existing literature rarely examines the micro-structural dynamics regarding how internal friction, limited budget literacy, and horizontal coordination barriers simultaneously impact the efficiency of infrastructure monitoring at the village level. Most qualitative studies remain trapped in normative-juridical evaluations without dissecting the political-behavioral interactions between village actors navigating information asymmetries [1]. This explicit focus on micro-

local dynamics constitutes the novelty of this study and fills the current scientific vacuum.

Grounded in these theoretical gaps and empirical problems, this study aims to comprehensively analyze how the BPD in Tolondadu I Village executes its supervisory function in monitoring village infrastructure development. Furthermore, this research intends to map out and disentangle the technical, competence-based, and horizontal coordination barriers encompassing both the internal and external environments of the BPD. Practically, the insights generated from this study are expected to offer strategic recommendations for regional governments in designing targeted capacity-building models for BPD members, as well as formulating a collaborative framework capable of integrating constituent aspirations directly into the village budget monitoring system.

To ensure a precise and data-driven investigation, the research questions for this study are tailored directly to evaluate the empirical framework of local oversight and are formulated as follows:

1. How does the Village Consultative Body (BPD) in Tolondadu I Village operationalize its sequential supervisory strategies spanning regulatory monitoring, persuasive warnings, clarification meetings, and executive escalation to oversee village administration and infrastructure planning?
2. What multidimensional barriers, specifically regarding capacity deficits linked to varied educational backgrounds, the absence of regional technical guidance, and passive member participation, hinder

the BPD from optimizing its horizontal check-and-balance function?

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

### **Research Approach and Design**

This study employs a qualitative approach with a descriptive research design. Qualitative research is heavily oriented toward understanding the deeply embedded meanings, contexts, and systemic logic behind empirical phenomena within a natural, undisturbed setting [6]. Rather than testing predefined statistical hypotheses, establishing correlations, or offering predictive generalized models, a descriptive qualitative design seeks to systematically map, clarify, and narrate real-world conditions. Specifically, this methodology is utilized to evaluate the actual execution of the horizontal supervisory function by the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and to diagnose the collaborative dynamics inside the village administration framework.

### **Research Focus**

To provide a structured and meticulous boundary for empirical data gathering, the analysis of this study is anchored upon the following focus and sub-focus dimensions:

1. The Core Supervisory Mechanisms: Investigating how the BPD operationalizes its regulatory enforcement, persuasive warnings, internal clarification meetings, and executive escalation.
2. Scope of Programmatic Oversight: Evaluating the role of the BPD in monitoring development planning, infrastructure durability (e.g., farm production roads and irrigation networks),

asset inventory, and disaster response management.

3. The Multi-actor Interaction: Analyzing how the BPD accommodates and translates local community aspirations into democratic checks-and-balances during interactions with executive village actors.
4. Structural and Competence Barriers: Identifying internal capacity deficits, local political factionalism, and external coordination loops that disrupt the optimization of rural legislative oversight.

#### Informants and Selection Criteria

Primary data sources were obtained from key informants chosen through a non-probability purposive sampling technique. Informants were selected based on structural authority, professional proximity to the fiscal monitoring cycle, and firsthand involvement in the developmental workflows of Tolondadu I Village. The formal composition of the research informants is structured in Table 1:

**Table 1 List of Research Informants**

No	Position	Amount
1.	Village Head	1
2.	BPD Members	2
3.	Society	2
Amount		5 people

#### Data Collection Techniques

Data gathering was executed directly by the researcher serving as the primary human instrument through three interconnected qualitative techniques:

1. Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews: Conducted using flexible interview protocols to capture un-scripted operational narratives, institutional bottlenecks, and insights directly from

village executive, legislative, and community actors.

2. Field Observation: Employing passive observation to examine the localized working environment, administrative infrastructure, community meetings, and the physical state of village developmental projects.
3. Documentary Studies: Collecting authentic, official administrative artifacts, including the Village Budget (*APBDes*), BPD meeting minutes, realization reports, and relevant legal regulations [7].

#### Data Validity (Triangulation)

To safeguard the academic trustworthiness, credibility, and overall rigor of the qualitative findings, this study strictly applied source triangulation and technical triangulation. Source triangulation was operationalized by systematically cross-checking and verifying verbal interview testimonies across different layers of actors (comparing the defensive narrative of the Village Head against the critical evaluation of the BPD and the grievances of the community). Technical triangulation was performed by juxtaposing verbal interview accounts against field observation field notes and concrete physical documentation found inside the village archives.

#### Data Analysis Techniques

The empirical qualitative data were evaluated inductively following the interactive analysis model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña [8]. This rigorous analytical framework progresses through three concurrent, iterative streams of activities:

1. **Data Condensation:** The process of selecting, focusing, abstracting, and converting raw field notes and verbatim interview transcripts. Irrelevant data lacking direct convergence with the BPD's oversight functions or rural barriers were systematically filtered out.
2. **Data Display:** Organizing the condensed, thematic codes into structured narrative texts, matrices, or conceptual flowcharts, allowing the researcher to readily identify underlying patterns of coordination gaps or capacity limits.
3. **Conclusion Drawing and Verification:** Interpreting the structurally displayed data to discover meanings, operational loop gaps, and administrative realities. Initial conclusions were continuously verified against empirical evidence and triangulation findings to eliminate subjectivity and ensure critical validity.

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### **Operationalization of the BPD's Supervisory Function in Tolondadu I Village**

The first objective of this study was to evaluate how the Village Consultative Body (BPD) of Tolondadu I Village operationalizes its sequential oversight strategies across various village administrative tasks and development programs. Empirical findings demonstrate that the BPD formally divides its supervisory actions into structural phases, namely data gathering, real-time monitoring, and post-activity assessment. This is corroborated by the statement of the Village Secretary:

*"The supervisory function includes various activities, one of which is the collection of information regarding the creation of an activity or the application of a regulation. Monitoring is an additional type of activity... especially activities that aim to assist, guide, and carry out a movement in accordance with a pre-planned arrangement; and Assessment is the process of thoroughly analyzing how far an activity has been carried out in accordance with the preparation made before." (Interview Result, January 15, 2024).*

In day-to-day operations, the BPD applies this mechanism to oversee several critical focus areas in Tolondadu I Village, including village development planning, structural governance mapping, inter-village partnerships, investment allocations, the management of village-owned enterprises (BUM Desa), village asset mutations, and emergency response budgets. To enforce compliance among executive actors, the field data reveals that the BPD implements a formal four-stage sequential escalation protocol:

1. **Regulatory Enforcement:** Direct monitoring of village executive operations to check for adherence to established local frameworks and budget structures.
2. **Persuasive Warning:** Giving polite, formal or verbal warnings to village operators immediately when a procedural error or project delay is detected.
3. **Internal Clarification Meeting:** Conducting a structured village meeting led directly by the BPD Chairman to

demand accountability from the executive apparatus regarding unresolved issues.

4. Executive Escalation: Imposing regulatory sanctions or reporting stubborn non-compliance issues directly to the Sub-district Head (*Camat*) and the Regent (*Bupati*) for official administrative follow-up.

### Multidimensional Barriers Hampering Effective BPD Oversight

The second objective of this study was to map out the internal and external challenges preventing the BPD from optimizing its horizontal check-and-balance mandate. The empirical evidence points toward a multidimensional bottleneck, categorizable into capacity deficits, structural guidance gaps, and low internal participation.

1. Internal Capacity Deficits and Varied Educational Backgrounds

The BPD of Tolondadu I Village consists of 5 members chosen directly via hamlet-representative elections. Field data shows that the primary internal barrier stems from a severe limitation in human resources, particularly regarding village financial management and infrastructure evaluation literacy. This capacity gap is heavily linked to the varied and relatively low formal educational levels among the members, as detailed in Table 2:

**Table 2 Educational Profiles of BPD Members in Tolondadu I Village**

No.	Structural Position	Formal Educational Level	Count
1.	Chairman	Junior High School (SMP)	1

2.	Vice Chairman	Bachelor's Degree (S1)	1
3.	Secretary	Senior High School (SMA)	1
4.	Members	Senior High School (SMA)	2
Total			5 Members

This structural imbalance makes it difficult for the body to collectively digest complex fiscal reports. A local government representative explicitly highlighted this constraint:

*"The implementation has not been maximized due to the low human resources in managing village finances from the BPD members themselves." (Interview Result, January 15, 2024).*

2. Absence of Regional Technical Guidance

This competence bottleneck is worsened by an external institutional gap: the lack of systemic training from higher government authorities. The BPD is left to interpret its oversight duties independently without clear practical parameters. The Village Head emphasized this structural issue:

*"In terms of implementation, we have indeed made progress, but it still cannot be said to be satisfactory due to the lack of human resources who understand this, then the lack of technical guidance (Bimtek) from the Regional Government, especially in its main tasks and functions of BPD." (Interview Result, January 15, 2024).*

### 3. Passive Member Participation and Internal Friction

Lastly, the research indicates that the BPD's internal oversight quality collapses due to a lack of cohesion and active commitment from its members. Instead of functioning as an integrated committee, oversight responsibilities often fall solely upon the core leadership, rendering checks-and-balances superficial. Reflecting on this internal loop, the Village Head stated:

*"Due to the lack of active participation of all its members, the Village Consultative Body in Tolondadu I Village... has not carried out all of its responsibilities as a BPD." (Interview Result, January 15, 2024).*

## DISCUSSION

### Operationalization of the BPD's Sequential Oversight Protocol

Based on the empirical findings gathered from the field, the Village Consultative Body (BPD) of Tolondadu I Village operationalizes its supervisory role through a structured, multi-stage sequential protocol to monitor village administration and infrastructure development. The research shows that the BPD splits its activities into three core phases: data collection, real-time concurrent monitoring, and final post-activity assessment. This framework is applied directly across various village programs, including development planning, infrastructure projects (such as farm production roads and irrigation networks), BUM Desa activities, asset

inventory management, and emergency responses. When executive violations or anomalies are detected, the BPD executes a formal four-stage escalation strategy: enforcing local regulations, issuing polite warnings, holding internal clarification meetings led by the BPD Chairman, and finally, escalating unresolved non-compliance to the Sub-district Head (*Camat*) and Regent (*Bupati*) for official administrative sanctions.

In the framework of *Public Sector Agency Theory*, this empirical sequence serves as an institutional mechanism designed to minimize information asymmetry and curb the potential for moral hazard or elite capture by the village executive (the agent) who manages substantial fiscal resources [1]. The initial phases of this protocol regulatory monitoring and persuasive warnings represent ex-ante and concurrent control measures aimed at enforcing procedural formalization. By establishing clear monitoring boundaries over critical village assets, BUM Desa, and infrastructure planning, the BPD functions as a horizontal check to ensure that the agent's execution remains aligned with the public mandates of the citizenry (the principal) [9].

However, the transition from superficial monitoring to enforcement through clarification meetings and executive escalation reveals the complexities of local accountability. While literature indicates that highly formalized oversight structures significantly improve transparency and compliance with financial standards [10][1], the reliance on a multi-stage escalation path indicates that horizontal accountability at the village level is frequently non-coercive in its

early stages. The BPD's strategy of delivering "polite warnings" before initiating formal clarification or escalating issues to the Sub-district Head or Regent shows an effort to balance rigid legal supervision with local socio-political norms. When horizontal checks face resistance from the executive agent such as restricting access to budget documents vertical escalation to higher government tiers becomes the ultimate tool to enforce accountability [11]. This sequence proves that horizontal oversight cannot stand alone; its teeth depend on integrated links with vertical, higher-level administrative sanctions to effectively correct the misbehavior of village agents.

### **Multidimensional Barriers Hampering Effective BPD Oversight**

The empirical results of this study reveal that the BPD's supervisory function is severely hindered by a combination of internal and external bottlenecks that form a multidimensional barrier. Internally, there is a severe capacity deficit linked to the varied and relatively low formal educational levels among the 5 BPD members (where the Chairman only completed junior high school, two members completed senior high school, and only the Vice Chairman holds a bachelor's degree). This limitation results in low literacy regarding village financial management and infrastructure auditing. Externally, the research captures a total absence of systemic technical guidance (*Bimtek*) from the regional government, leaving the BPD without practical operational parameters. Furthermore, the field data highlights a critical breakdown in internal participation, where oversight

duties fall entirely upon core leaders due to the passive commitment and lack of active participation from other members.

From the analytical lens of *Public Sector Agency Theory*, these empirical barriers explain why horizontal checks-and-balances collapse into mere administrative formalities. The theory assumes that the supervising principal (or their legislative representative) possesses the necessary literacy to process information and detect agent deviations. The empirical data sharply contradicts this assumption; low formal education acts as a structural barrier to mastering complex village financial management and technical infrastructure auditing. This lack of expertise maintains high information asymmetry, making it easy for executive agents to obscure suboptimal work behind technical jargon or administrative formalities [12][1].

Additionally, the lack of external training and the presence of internal passivity turn the BPD's formalized protocols into empty ritualism. Literature underscores that resource-constrained rural areas require continuous external training (*Bimtek*) to overcome baseline capacity deficits and understand *how* to execute data abstraction or audit physical development targets [11][13]. When this institutional support is absent, and is compounded by passive member participation, the committee's structural solidarity completely collapses. In public governance models, effective checks-and-balances rely on collective, active institutional participation to resist elite dominance [14]. The final consequence of these combined barriers is that the village head is left to

operate with little day-to-day pushback, turning what should be a robust horizontal check into a superficial, year-end bureaucratic formality.

## CONCLUSION

Grounded in the framework of Public Sector Agency Theory, this study concludes that while the Village Consultative Body (BPD) of Tolondadu I Village has established a theoretically sound, four-stage sequential oversight protocol—encompassing regulatory monitoring, persuasive warnings, clarification meetings, and executive escalation—its real-world execution remains highly superficial. The BPD successfully maps its monitoring goals across vital rural sectors, including infrastructure durability, asset mutations, and BUM Desa planning. However, its capacity to reduce information asymmetry and eliminate the moral hazard of the executive agent is structurally paralyzed.

The critical breakdown of this horizontal accountability mechanism is directly caused by a multidimensional bottleneck. Low formal educational backgrounds among BPD members generate severe internal capacity deficits, rendering them legally and technically ill-equipped to audit complex financial configurations. This systemic vulnerability is further exacerbated by external institutional neglect in the form of absent regional technical guidance (*Bimtek*), alongside a severe decay in internal institutional solidarity driven by passive member participation. Consequently, without systemic capacity-building interventions and formalized regional support, the structural

formalization of rural legislative oversight fails to foster genuine democracy, collapsing instead into an empty, year-end bureaucratic ritual.

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