THE ROLE OF THE VILLAGE CONSULTATIVE BODY (BPD) IN SUPERVISING VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TOLONDADU I VILLAGE, BOLAANG MONGONDOW REGENCY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47918/9y7yyx20Kata Kunci:
BPD Supervision, Village Governance, Agency Theory, Capacity Deficits, Technical Guidance, Horizontal Accountability.Abstrak
The strategic implementation of horizontal checks-and-balances is a key determinant for transparent rural governance, yet it is often restricted by complex micro-level structural realities. This study aims to determine and analyze: (1) how the Village Consultative Body (BPD) operationalizes its sequential supervisory strategies over village administration and infrastructure planning, and (2) the multidimensional barriers that hinder the BPD from optimizing its horizontal check-and-balance function. Executed in Tolondadu I Village, Bolaang Uki District, South Bolaang Mongondow Regency, this study adopted a qualitative descriptive design. Data were collected through field observations, secondary documentation analysis, and semi-structured in-depth interviews using a purposive sampling technique with key informants, including the Village Head, BPD members, and local community representatives. The data were evaluated inductively using the interactive analysis model (data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing) and validated through source and technical triangulation. The results indicate that: (1) the BPD formalizes its oversight through distinct structural phases (data collection, real-time concurrent monitoring, and post-activity assessment) across key village sectors such as infrastructure development, BUM Desa management, and asset mutations. When compliance errors occur, the BPD executes a four-stage sequential escalation protocol consisting of regulatory monitoring, persuasive warnings, internal clarification meetings, and executive escalation to the Camat and Bupati; (2) the optimization of this supervisory framework collapses into a superficial year-end bureaucratic formality due to a multidimensional bottleneck. This constraint is driven internally by severe capacity deficits linked to varied and low formal educational levels among BPD members, an absolute absence of regional technical guidance (Bimtek) from higher government tiers, and an internal breakdown of active member participation.
Unduhan
Referensi
[1] N. Syamsul, N. Nurlailah, and N. Nurhadi, “From transparency to accountability: Determinants of village financial governance,” Multidiscip. Sci. J., vol. 8, no. 9, 2026, doi: 10.31893/multiscience.2026575.
[2] B. Prianto, D. Suharnoko, P. D. Molyo, and S. Widayati, “Patronage and low competency of members as causes of weak implementation of the functions of the village consultative body in realizing a self-governing community,” J. Infrastructure, Policy Dev., vol. 8, no. 9, 2024, doi: 10.24294/jipd.v8i9.6699.
[3] D. K. Sugiharti, Z. Muttaqin, and R. H. Ramadhani, “The Supervision of Village Fund Management to Prevent Corruption,” Padjadjaran J. Ilmu Huk., vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 356–378, 2021, doi: 10.22304/pjih.v8n3.a3.
[4] A. Putra, A. F. Farhan, and A. E. Istiqoh, “Managing Villages from the Seaside: The Strategic Role of BPD in the Formulation of Village Regulations in the Bintan Coastal Region,” in IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Government Science Study Program, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji, Tanjungpinang, Indonesia: Institute of Physics, 2025. doi: 10.1088/1755-1315/1559/1/012050.
[5] L. Rumkel, B. Sam, and M. C. B. Umanailo, “Village head partnership, village consultative body and customary institution in village development,” Int. J. Sci. Technol. Res., vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1058–1063, 2019, [Online]. Available: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85071515820&partnerID=40&md5=dd04740dabd6160d0ac9cd25ddd5da16
[6] L. Moleong, Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2021.
[7] S. Arikunto, Prosedur Penelitian: Suatu Pendekatan Praktik. Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2016.
[8] M. B. Miles, A. M. Huberman, and J. Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook, 3rd edition. SAGE Publication: SAGE Publication, 2014.
[9] S. Zheng, C. Ye, and W. Hu, “Effects of the Supervision Down to the Countryside on Public Spending: Empirical Evidence from Rural China,” Sustain., vol. 17, no. 18, 2025, doi: 10.3390/su17188268.
[10] C. N. Makanga, L. K. Orobia, T. K. Kaawaase, I. N. Nabeta, R. K. Mindra, and J. C. Munene, “Oversight mechanisms and public accountability in an emerging economy,” Cogent Bus. Manag., vol. 12, no. 1, 2025, doi: 10.1080/23311975.2025.2507216.
[11] R. S. Wardhani, D. Altin, and S. Suhdi, “Diagnosing Accountability Challenges in Indonesia’s Village Fund: a PESTEL–PRMT Multi-Case Analysis in Post-Decentralization Governance,” Public Organ. Rev., 2025, doi: 10.1007/s11115-025-00922-0.
[12] R. E. Diansari, A. A. Musah, and J. Binti Othman, “Factors affecting village fund management accountability in Indonesia: The moderating role of prosocial behaviour,” Cogent Bus. Manag., vol. 10, no. 2, 2023, doi: 10.1080/23311975.2023.2219424.
[13] G. T. Zvaita and E. Shava, “Implementation of digital governance to enhance oversight in local municipalities,” Front. Sustain. Cities, vol. 8, 2026, doi: 10.3389/frsc.2026.1713754.
[14] D. Kurniasih, P. I. Setyoko, M. Imron, and S. S. Wijaya, “The role of stakeholders in the Accountability of Village Enterprise Management: A Public Governance Approach,” in IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Departement of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Jenderal Soedirman University, Purwokerto, Indonesia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 2019. doi: 10.1088/1755-1315/255/1/012056.
